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ABSTRACT 
The European Union encourages individuals to save in private and 
occupational pension funds to complement their state saving-plans. 
Throughout their lives, employers directly sponsor occupational 
retirement saving plans, so individual employees may top up their future 
pensions. While the European Union clearly supports the formation and 
cross-border participation in these financial vehicles by adopting EU 
regulatory framework, the EU has also decided to determine a common 
investment decision standard to be used in all Member States, called the 
Prudent Person Principle. According to this principle, the fund - the future 
retirement for many - shall be managed with care, the skill of an expert, 
prudence and due diligence. Under this principle, the pension fund’s 
governing body is given a broad authority to invest the pension assets in 
a prudent fashion in light of the particular investment plan of a fund. At 
the same time, the EU is also moving towards more Responsible 
Investment and inclusion of the ESG-principles (Environment, Social and 
Governance). The question we aim to answer in this paper is how these 
two principles co-exist and whether, due to the new Directive adopted by 
the occupational pension funds in 2016, all funds are obliged to make only 
responsible, environmentally and socially beneficial investments. 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Occupational pension funds [also known as “institutions for 
occupational retirement provision” (‘IORP’)] are financial institutions that 
manage employers’ collective retirement schemes in order to provide 
benefits to employees. The occupational funds play an important role in 
securing a reasonable retirement plan for workers once their careers end. 
Currently, in the European Union there are more than 125,000 
occupational pension funds, holding assets worth €2.5 trillion on behalf 
of 75 million Europeans, which represents 20% of the EU’s working-age 
population.1 As the large funds administered by the occupational pension 
funds are invested in stocks, bonds and other securities, they also have a 
huge impact on the business world. Investment and divestment decisions 
of the occupational pension funds may thus favour one sector, e.g. 
sustainable energy with cheap access to finances to the detriment of e.g. 
the fossil industry. The question, however, is whether “sustainable” 
investment design may be detrimental to the return on investment, and in 
the affirmative, whether the board of the occupational pension fund may 
be found liable towards the beneficiaries for the losses incurred. This 
question has been a subject of discussions and a few court cases.2 At the 
                                                            
1 Revision of the Occupational Pension Funds Directive – frequently asked questions, 
Brussels, (European Commission,1 July 2016, p.1) <https://ec.europa.eu/info 
/system/files/memo-faq-iorp-directive-revision-01072016_en.pdf> accessed 10 July 
2017. 
2 Will be described and analysed in section 3. 
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same time, all the EU Member States have adopted a new investment 
standard – “the prudent person principle” - applying now to all EU 
Member States.3 In this article, authors first explain the relevance of 
accountability standards in capital markets and their recent application 
across the pension fund industry. The importance of this section lies in 
introducing a movement that has taken place in the entire financial 
industry and has affected all the intermediaries, including the occupational 
pension funds. The analysis starts with general remarks on the 
international accountability standards that have been stirring the 
discussion about what sustainability means. This section provides the 
reader with the necessary background for understanding the later 
discourse on “Responsible Investment”. Afterwards, the authors move to 
analyse the prudent person principle, the origins of this principle, and its 
nature in three selected jurisdictions, namely Denmark, the Netherlands 
and the UK. Subsequently, the recent 2016 EU Directive on occupational 
pension funds is analysed with the focus on its introduction of the 
“Principles for Responsible Investment”. The article reflects on the 
possible liability issues arising from the prudent person principle and 
“responsible investment”. 
2. INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY STANDARDS ON 
CAPITAL MARKETS 
Capital markets finance the economy. Financial institutions 
represent the source of capital for corporations, acquisitions as well as new 
ventures. Financial institutions stand at the beginning of capital 
distribution to any other existing or future business. Financial institutions 
have a unique opportunity to contribute to solving the big challenges our 
societies face, be it contribution to limiting the global warming to a 
maximum of 2 degrees Celsius, respecting human rights in business or the 
fight against child labour. Financial institutions stand at the very beginning 
of the value creation and therefore these institutions have the ability to 
redefine the entire value chain and focus on using their financial leverage 
towards a positive change. Sustainable development has been identified as 
a possible benefit for business and finance. Commercial banks, investment 
banks, pension funds as well as other financial intermediaries have realised 
this and many have already started to take this factor into their equation, 
naming it “Sustainability”, “CSR” or “ESG” in their materials and 
references. 
International Accountability Standards (IAS) are understood as 
recognised principles assisting corporations with their social and 
environmental responsibility. Within the financial sector, there are 
different IAS that have been adopted. The guideline wave started in 2003, 
                                                            
3 Details are available online at: <http://ec.europa.eu/info/law/institutions-
occupational-retirement-provision-iorp-directive-2003-41-ec/implementation 
/implementation-eu-countries_en> accessed 1 September 2017. 
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when several banks adopted the Equator Principles.4 Numerous financial 
institutions have voluntarily undertaken to commit themselves to ensure 
due diligence procedures, analyse and manage the impact of their clients’ 
projects in accordance with the World Bank’s Environmental and Social 
Standards and the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC) Performance 
Standards. Initially, a small group of leading financial institutions created 
principles that would help them analyse projects for environmental and 
social risk in emerging markets.5 Currently eighty-nine financial 
institutions apply the Equator Principles. Beside the Equator Principles, 
in 2006 the IFC also adopted the IFC Sustainability Framework.6 Yet, 
probably the most known in the financial industry are the Principles for 
Responsible Investment that has been working with the ESG abbreviation 
- Environmental, Social and Governance.7 
2.1. THE PRINCIPLES FOR RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT AND ESG: HOW 
CLOSE TO CSR? 
The Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), adopted in 2006, 
complement the UN Global Compact and the UN Environment Program 
Finance Initiative. The PRI introduced six principles in the area of ESG 
issues. These six principles were developed by investors and are supported 
by more than 1,400 signatory institutions from more than fifty countries, 
currently representing more than US$59 trillion of assets.8 The crucial 
argument of the PRI is that ESG factors have a material effect on the 
returns delivered to clients and beneficiaries.  
                                                            
4 Ten major international commercial banks ABN AMRO, Barclays, Citigroup, Crédit 
Lyonnais, Crédit Suisse, HypoVereinsbank, Rabobank and the Royal Bank of Scotland 
together with WestLb and Westpact adopted the Equator Principles, a charter to ensure 
that the projects they finance are socially responsible and respect environment. Until 
today additional seventy-nine financial institutions have signed up the initiative. 
5 See Suellen Lambert Lazarus, 'The Equator Principles: Retaining the Gold Standard: A 
Strategic Vision at 10 Years' in Karen Wendt (ed), Responsible Investment Banking: Risk 
Management Frameworks, Sustainable Financial Innovation and Softlaw Standards (Responsible 
Investment Banking: Risk Management Frameworks, Sustainable Financial Innovation 
and Softlaw Standards, Springer 2015), at 124-125; See also ‘About the Equator Principles 
Strategic Review – 2010/2011’, <www.equator-principles.com/index.php/strategic-
review-2010-2011> accessed 3 May 2017. 
6 The IFC Sustainability Framework includes (i) The Policy on Environmental and Social 
Sustainability, (ii) The Performance Standards, (iii) The Access to Information Policy and 
(iv) Environmental and Social Categorization, <www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/topics 
_ext_content/ifc_external_corporate_site/sustainability+and+disclosure/environment
al-social-governance/sustainability+framework> accessed 3 May 2017. 
7 <www.unpri.org/about> accessed 3 May 2017. 
8 See Principles for Responsible Investment: An Investor Initiative in partnership with 
UNEP Finance Initiative and the UN Global Compact at 4. <www.unpri.org/about> 
accessed 3 May 2017. 
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According to the PRI, the management of the signatory institutions, 
where consistent with their fiduciary responsibilities, commit themselves to: 
Incorporate ESG issues into investment analysis and decision 
making processes; 
Be active owners and incorporate ESG issues into their ownership 
policies and practices; 
Seek appropriate disclosure on ESG issues by the entities in which 
they invest; 
Promote acceptance and implementation of the Principles within the 
investment industry; 
Enhance their effectiveness in implementing the Principles; 
Report on their activities and progress towards implementing the 
Principles; 
However, what are the ESG factors that the Principles refer to and 
how do they depart from the notions that we already know, such as CSR? 
The PRI on their website enumerate only few examples of the ESG 
factors. From environmental indicators it names climate change, 
greenhouse gases, waste and pollution, from social indicators it names 
slavery or child labour and from governance indicators it names issues as 
executive pay, board diversity or tax strategy. When breaking down the 
three areas, the PRI itself does not provide financial institutions with an 
exhaustive list of factors that they should take into consideration in order 
to carry out responsible investment.9 This approach of the UN’s drafting 
indicates the understanding that the ESG factors are changing. Depending 
on the specific financial sector, region and the development of the market 
itself the ESG factors may vary. Moreover, also the formulation of the 
factors for individual institutions is of crucial importance, given that the 
entire idea behind the PRI as well as the UN Global Compact emphasises 
the active engagement of the financial institutions with their clients, investors 
as well as the societies within which they operate.10 Thus, the PRI together 
with ESG represent a procedural side of understanding and determining 
sustainability goals that continue to develop in the light of societal change 
and scientific discoveries. 
Reflecting on the commonalities between the ESG notion and the 
CSR notion that has been present since the fifties,11 the concepts are very 
                                                            
9 The PRI association itself also adheres to the standards, but it is also incoherent. While 
the environmental package is compliant to ISO 14001 (certification standard), the social 
area works with a charity in order to narrow down the factors and within the governance, 
the PRI association is governed by the PRI Association Board. 
10 See Thomas Beschorner & Martin Müller, ‘Social Standards: Towards an Active Ethical 
Involvement of Businesses in Developing Countries’ (2006) 73 Journal of Business 
Ethics 7, 11-20. 
11 In 1953 Bowen wrote a seminal book on Social Responsibilities of the Businessman. For 
more on the ESG and CSR, see Tineke Lambooy, ‘Legal Aspects of Corporate Social 
Responsibility’ (2014) 30 Utrecht Journal of International and European Law 78; John L. 
Campbell, ‘Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially Responsible Ways? An 
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similar. They both take environmental and societal factors into 
consideration. Human rights have been taken as a basis for both notions.12 
The above mentioned IAS are based on environmental, labour and/or 
human rights, adopted by the UN, ILO, OECD as well as numerous 
independent States through their individual Constitutions. The main 
characteristic of both notions is that they are evolving and reflect the 
standing of our society/ies. The only difference between the two is the 
incorporation of governance considerations in the ESG, which 
presumably was affected by the OECD Corporate Governance wave.13 
Moreover, ESG should be perceived as a merge between the UNCTAD, 
UNEP, UN Global Compact and PRI principles. 
Looking at the ESG from a quantitative perspective, for determining 
ESG performance indicators effectively, it is essential to identify the 
appropriate key performance indicators (KPI). The European Federation 
on Financial Analysts Societies (EFFAS) states that KPIs for ESG should 
meet certain requirements: significance, measurability, comparability, 
reliability, usefulness and traceability. Usually, the environmental, 
economic and social corporate data and information are being monitored, 
coded, registered and aggregated into KPIs.14 Linking objectives of non-
financial indicators with the financial goals of a corporation should 
contribute materially to reaching long-time sustainable performance and 
to the sustainability reporting itself. Thus, KPIs and ESG have always 
been perceived as contributing to long-time performance of an institution 
and thus being in the interest of the shareholders.   
                                                            
Institutional Theory of Corporate Social Responsibility’ (2007) 32 Academy of 
Management Review 3. 
12 For CSR see Douglass Cassel, 'Human Rights and Business Responsibilities in the 
Global Marketplace' (2001) 11 Business Ethics Quarterly 261. 
13 In 1996 the OECD Ministers decided that a Business Sector Advisory Group on 
Corporate Governance should be established to review international corporate 
governance matters and develop a set of standards which should be followed by OECD 
countries. It has been understood that corporate activity has a direct impact on society 
and therefore the OECD Advisory Group on Corporate Governance has recognized that 
that societal interests should have an impact on corporate governance and that “(…) 
corporate actions must be compatible with societal objectives (…)” The Principles were 
introduced in 1999 and since then the latest revision took place in 2015. The Principles 
focus on publicly traded companies, both financial and non-financial. The Principles have 
been intended to help policy makers evaluate and improve the legal, regulatory and 
institutional framework for corporate governance. See Michael Galanis Alan Dignam, 
'Governing the World: The Development of the OECD's Corporate Goverancne 
Principles' (1999) 10 European Business Law Review 396. 
14 Felix Schnella & Ralf Frank Hendrik Garz, KPIs for ESG: A Guideline for the 
Integration of ESG into Financial Analysis and Corporate Validation (2010). 
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2.2. LOOKING AT THE SUSTAINABILITY GOAL FROM ANOTHER 
PERSPECTIVE: INVESTORS’ RIGHT TO BE INFORMED 
Aside from what is considered the “right thing to do” and the fact 
that it could be argued that the financial institutions should be the first to 
adhere to ESG standards as they represent the start of the flow of capital, 
it is necessary to realise the relevance of ESG from another perspective. 
This perspective is from the side of investors and their right to 
information.15 This right is materialised through diverse disclosure 
mechanisms required by capital market regulation. Disclosure on capital 
markets has additional relevance, as keeping fair and honest markets16 and 
preventing fraud or minimising systemic risk.17 Hence, information about 
all market participants, including corporations and financial institutions is 
normally considered of the utmost relevance.  
Investors consider a variety of factors when determining their 
investments. Annual reports, including both financial and non-financial 
information, have served as the traditional source of information. Yet, 
with the access to information online or through databases, investors are 
in a better position to receive greater amount of data. Often the question 
arises to what extent investors may effectively evaluate such data, but this 
is not the focus of this paper. Capital markets come with plenty of 
solutions to assess also non-financial information. Investment companies 
have developed ESG index funds which track the performance of 
companies with superior ESG index ratings and provide low cost, tax 
efficient and ESG investment.18 Investors have to simply invest in these 
indexes.19 Aside of the indices, there are few investors who focus only on 
                                                            
15 Ronald J. Gilson & Reiner H. Kraakman, 'The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency' 
(1984) 70 Virginia Law Review 549. 
16 See e.g. Michael E. Parrish, Securities Regulation and the New Deal (Yale University Press 
1970) at 3-5; The purpose of the US Securities Act of 1933, as stated in its preamble is 
‘[t]o provide full and fair disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate 
commerce and foreign commerce and through the mails, and to prevent fraud in the sale 
thereof, and for other purposes.’ Furthermore, the Senate Committee on Banking and 
Commerce stated that ‘[t]he purpose of this bill is to protect the investing public and 
honest business. The basic policy is that of informing the investor of the facts concerning 
securities to be offered for sale in interstate and foreign commerce and providing 
protection against fraud and misrepresentation.’ S. REP. NO. 47, 73RD CONG., 1ST SESS. 1 
(1933). 
17 See e.g. Emilios Avgouleas, 'What Future for Disclosure as a Regulatory Technique? 
Lessons from Behavioural Decision Theory and the Global Financial Crisis' in Justion 
O'Brien Ian G. McNeil (ed), The Future of Financial Regulation (The Future of Financial 
Regulation, Hart Publishing 2010) at 205. 
18 MSCI has developed 11 ESG indices with over $56 billion in assets (December 2016); 
<www.msci.com/esg-index-family> accessed 16 May 2017. 
19 On the broad spread of ESG indices see Bloomberg ESG Data; < 
www.bloomberg.com/professional/blog/esg-indices-bringing-environmental-social-
governance-data-fore-asia-globally> accessed 16 May 2017. 
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sustainable investing, such as RobecoSAM or Vontobel. Furthermore, 
Bloomberg, Yahoo and the Financial Times also report on ESG 
performance. Bloomberg operates an ESG<GO> terminal which 
provides data on companies’ environmental, social and governance 
metrics. This service provides an overview of a company’s sustainability 
initiatives and ranks its performance within an industry.20 Moreover, stock 
exchanges also support such initiatives. Fifty-eight stock exchanges have 
collaborated with PRI and thus over seventy percent of listed equity 
markets, have made a public commitment to advance sustainability in their 
individual markets.21 Twelve stock exchanges have incorporated ESG 
reporting into their listing rules and fifteen provide formal guidance to 
issuers.22 It is thus obvious that this kind of information is taken into 
consideration by various market participants. 
The efficient market theory states that share prices reflect all known 
information relating to a share.23 All new information has the potential to 
affect the fundamental valuation of stock price. The more complete and 
reliable the information available is, the more accurate the valuation of the 
future performance of the respective security. The attention to ESG issues 
might be relatively recent, yet this has already been implemented by most 
of the financial institutions. Even if extra-financial information may not 
necessarily affect the price of a company’s share during normal 
operations,24 in cases where reputational or monetarily quantifiable 
litigation risk exists, investment professionals pay much attention to the 
respective pieces of information.25 This is the rationale behind the 
companies’ disclosure requirements on extra-financial aspects, which 
capture additional dimensions of corporate performance that are not 
accounted for within financial data.26 
                                                            
20 Bloomberg, Bloomberg ESG Function for Sustainability Investors adds Robeco SAM Data, 
September 29, 2016, <www.bloomberg.com/company/announcements/esg-function-
adds-robecosam/> accessed 16 May 2017. 
21 Sustainable Stock Exchanges Initiative, 2016 Report on Progress, at 6; 
<www.sseinitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/SSE-Report-on-Progress-
2016.pdf> accessed 22 May 2017. 
22 More recently, the London Stock Exchange issued ESG guidelines for listed 
companies. It has also sent its guidelines to more than 2,700 companies listed on its UK 
and Italian exchanges; <www.lseg.com/esg> accessed 16 May 2017. 
23 See Donald C. Langevoort, 'Theories, Assumptions, and Securities Regulation: Market 
Efficiency Revisited' (1992) 150 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 851, at 851-852 
and Lawrence A. Cunningham, 'Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclosure, and Price 
Discovery' (1994) Washington and Lee Law Review 843.  
24 Some practitioners consider ESG data to be a distraction, see Patrick Sheehan, ESG 
data can be a distraction, Financial Times, March 6, 2017. 
25 This has been shown by the recent stock fall of the stock value of the Volkswagen by 
thirty percent due to its diesel emission scandal. 
26 Such disclosure obligation was recently introduced in the EU by the Directive 
2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2014 
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To summarise, the above description shows that various soft law 
instrument strongly encourage institutional investors such as pension 
funds to take ESG-factors into account when making investment or 
divestment decisions. This raises the question whether under the national 
law, pension funds are also entitled to take such considerations into 
account or whether they may risk liability by doing so. Under the existing 
systems, understanding the concept of the “prudent person” is central if 
this question is to be answered. 
3. PRUDENT PERSON PRINCIPLE IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 
DENMARK AND THE NETHERLANDS: PROTECTING 
OCCUPATIONAL PENSION FUNDS 
3.1. INTRODUCTION OF THE PRUDENT PERSON AND ITS MEANING 
The prudent person rule was historically developed in common law 
jurisdictions, namely England and the US, via case-law. Fiduciary duties in 
both countries in the nineteenth century were conservative, this was due 
to the legal restrictions on possible trustees’ investment as a fiduciary was 
perceived more as a conservator of wealth than a reproducer.27 However, 
with the evolvement of the markets and novel investment possibilities, the 
limiting perception of a fiduciary was altered. And the rule of the “prudent 
person” was clarified in the famous case of Harvard College v. Amory28 
decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in 1830. The 
decision states that: 
‘All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he shall conduct himself 
faithfully and exercise sound discretion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion, 
and intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to speculation, but in regard to 
the permanent disposition of their funds, considering the probable income, as well as the 
probable safety of the capital to be invested.’29 
This more “modern” form in precise statutory language was applied 
to pensions in both the United States and the United Kingdom, by the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) in the US30 
                                                            
amending Directive 2013/34/EU as regards disclosure of non-financial and diversity 
information by certain large undertakings and groups, OJ L 330/1. 
27 Mayo Adams Shattuck, 'The Development of the Prudent Man Rule for Fiduciary 
Investment in the United States in the Twentieth Century' (1951) 12 Ohio State Law 
Journal 491, at 492. 
28 9 Pick. (Mass.) 446 (1830). 
29 Ibid. 
30 Section 404(a) of ERISA stipulates: (1)Subject to sections 1103(c) and (d), 1342, and 
1344 of this title, a fiduciary shall discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the 
interest of the participants and beneficiaries and— (A)for the exclusive purpose of: (i) 
providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying reasonable 
expenses of administering the plan; (B) with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under 
the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar 
with such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with 
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and in the Pensions Act 1995 in the UK.31 Pension law has in the Anglo-
Saxon tradition been perceived as a unique combination of trust and 
contract law principles.32 
Before the prudent person principle was introduced at EU level (see 
further below), the Member States by and large had applied different 
quantitative portfolio regulations in the financial sector. These quantitative 
regulations came in different shapes, for example imposing limits on 
investing in certain assets or restrictions on assets allocation. Typically, 
those instruments, the holding of which was limited or forbidden, were 
those with high price volatility and/or low liquidity and/or high credit risk, 
such as equities, venture capital/unquoted shares and real estate, as well 
as foreign assets.33 
Quantitative portfolio regulations and restrictions have been the 
subject of criticism on the grounds that they lead to lower returns, are 
inflexible when necessary to adjust and adapt investment strategies and 
tend to discourage competition among investors. In 1998 Davis found 
that in OECD states, where a prudent person rule was applied, there is a 
higher rate on investment in equities as compared to states with 
quantitative portfolio regulations and that the former had a higher rate of 
return during 1967-1990.34 This contributed to a policy shift also in the 
EU and the adoption of the prudent person principle in Directive 2003/41 
                                                            
like aims; (C) by diversifying the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of 
large losses, unless under the circumstances it is clearly prudent not to do so; and (D) in 
accordance with the documents and instruments governing the plan insofar as such 
documents and instruments are consistent with the provisions of this subchapter and 
subchapter III. (2) In the case of an eligible individual account plan (as defined in section 
1107(d)(3) of this title), the diversification requirement of paragraph (1)(C) and the 
prudence requirement (only to the extent that it requires diversification) of paragraph 
(1)(B) is not violated by acquisition or holding of qualifying employer real property or 
qualifying employer securities (as defined in section 1107(d)(4) and (5) of this title). 
31 Sections 33-36 of the Pension Act 1995. 
32 John H. Langbein, 'The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of 
Commerce' (1997) 107 Yale Law Journal 165 (‘[T]he typical trust … embodies a contract-
like relationship … about how the trustee will manage the trust assets and distribute them 
to the trust beneficiaries. The difference between a trust and a third-party beneficiary 
contract is largely a lawyer’s conceptualism. When, therefore, we enforce a trust … we 
are already in the realm of contract-like behaviour.’) and Eileen E. Gillese, 'Pension Plans 
and the Law of Trusts' (1996) 75 Canadian Bar Review 221, 250 (‘Pension law … is the 
intersection of competing system of law: contract law and trust law.’). 
33 Philip E. Davis, 'Prudent Person Rules or Quantitative Restrictions? The Regulation 
of Long-term Institutional Investors' Portfolios' (2002) 1 Journal of Pension Economics 
and Finance 157, 169. 
34 Philip E. Davis, Financial market activity of life insurance companies and pension 
funds, 1998, Bank for International Settlements, Economic Paper No 21, BIS, Basle. 
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on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational 
retirement provision.35 
Directive 2003/41 in its preamble stipulates that the prudent person 
rule represents the underlying principle for capital investment of IORPs.36 
The prudent person rule is defined in Article 18 of Directive 2003/41.37 
The aim of this rule is to ensure adequate diversification, thus protecting 
the beneficiaries - the pensioners - against insolvency of a fund, lower 
returns and inability of pay out the retirement and other investment risks 
that are inherent in investment industry. The EU prudent person rule 
focuses on the process and behaviour of the person doing the investment. 
As explained by Bevis Longstreth:  
‘Prudent is to be found principally in the process by which investment strategies 
are developed, adopted, implemented, and monitored in light of the purpose for which 
funds are held, invested, and deployed. Prudence is demonstrated by the process through 
which risk is managed, rather than by the definition of specific risks that are imprudent. 
Under a modern paradigm, no investment is imprudent per se. The products and 
techniques of investment are essentially neutral. It is the way in which they are used, 
and how decisions as to their use are made, that should be examined to determine 
whether the prudence standard has been met. Even the most aggressive and 
                                                            
35 Bernhard Ebbinghaus, 'The Privatization and Marketization of Pensions in Europe: A 
Double Transformation Facing the Crisis' (2015) 1 European Policy Analysis 56. 
36 Article 6 of Preamble, Directive 2003/41. 
37 According to this article, pension funds shall invest in accordance with the 
following rules:  
(a) the assets shall be invested in the best interests of members and beneficiaries. In the case of a potential 
conflict of interest, the institution, or the entity which manages its portfolio, shall ensure that the investment 
is made in the sole interest of members and beneficiaries; 
(b) the assets shall be invested in such a manner as to ensure the security, quality, liquidity and 
profitability of the portfolio as a whole. 
Assets held to cover the technical provisions shall also be invested in a manner appropriate to the nature 
and duration of the expected future retirement benefits; 
(c) the assets shall be predominantly invested on regulated markets. Investment in assets which are not 
admitted to trading on a regulated financial market must in any event be kept to prudent levels; 
(d) investment in derivative instruments shall be possible insofar as they contribute to a reduction of 
investment risks or facilitate efficient portfolio management. They must be valued on a prudent basis, 
taking into account the underlying asset, and included in the valuation of the institution's assets. The 
institution shall also avoid excessive risk exposure to a single counterparty and to other derivative 
operations; 
(e) the assets shall be properly diversified in such a way as to avoid excessive reliance on any particular 
asset, issuer or group of undertakings and accumulations of risk in the portfolio as a whole. Investments 
in assets issued by the same issuer or by issuers belonging to the same group shall not expose the institution 
to excessive risk concentration; 
(f) investment in the sponsoring undertaking shall be no more than 5 % of the portfolio as a whole and, 
when the sponsoring undertaking belongs to a group, investment in the undertakings belonging to the 
same group as the sponsoring undertaking shall not be more than 10 % of the portfolio. When the 
institution is sponsored by a number of undertakings, investment in these sponsoring undertakings shall 
be made prudently, taking into account the need for proper diversification. 
IORPS & SUSTAINABILITY 40 
unconventional investment should meet that standard if arrived at through a sound 
process, while the most conservative and traditional one may not measure up if a sound 
process is lacking.’38 
The prudent person rule thus requires IORPs to have a robust 
system of internal checks and balances and a governance system in place 
rather than quantitative restrictions. However, some rules on cross-
investing are still in place under the Directive,39 and quantitative 
investment principles are still allowed under certain conditions.40 
After the 2003 Directive, the Solvency II Directive (2009/138/EC) 
was adopted in 2009. The Solvency II aimed at the taking-up and the 
pursuit of the business of insurance and reinsurance within the EU. The 
purpose of the Directive was to provide a legal framework for insurance 
and reinsurance undertakings to conduct insurance business throughout 
the internal market, thus making it easier for insurance and reinsurance 
undertakings with head offices in the EU to cover risks and commitments 
situated therein. Similarly, to the 2003 Directive, the Solvency II also 
marked a transition from a rule-based approach to a risk-based approach 
to investing and thus introduced the prudent person principle for 
investments made by insurance and reinsurance undertakings on a unified 
legislative basis, cf. article 132 of the Directive.41 The prudent person 
                                                            
38 Bevis Longstreth, Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule (Oxford 
University Press 1986), at 7. 
39 Article 18 (1(f) Directive 2003/41. 
40 See article 18, subsection 5-7. 
41 According to article 132 of Solvency II, the prudent person principle is defined in the 
following way:  
1. Member States shall ensure that insurance and reinsurance undertakings invest all their 
assets in accordance with the prudent person principle, as specified in paragraphs 2, 3 
and 4. 
2. With respect to the whole portfolio of assets, insurance and reinsurance undertakings 
shall only invest in assets and instruments whose risks the undertaking concerned can 
properly identify, measure, monitor, manage, control and report, and appropriately take 
into account in the assessment of its overall solvency needs in accordance with point (a) 
of the second subparagraph of Article 45(1). All assets, in particular those covering the 
Minimum Capital Requirement and the Solvency Capital Requirement, shall be invested 
in such a manner as to ensure the security, quality, liquidity and profitability of the 
portfolio as a whole. In addition the localisation of those assets shall be such as to ensure 
their availability. Assets held to cover the technical provisions shall also be invested in a 
manner appropriate to the nature and duration of the insurance and reinsurance liabilities. 
Those assets shall be invested in the best interest of all policy holders and beneficiaries 
taking into account any disclosed policy objective. In the case of a conflict of interest, 
insurance undertakings, or the entity which manages their asset portfolio, shall ensure 
that the investment is made in the best interest of policy holders and beneficiaries.  
3. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, with respect to assets held in respect of life insurance 
contracts where the investment risk is borne by the policy holders, the second, third and 
fourth subparagraphs of this paragraph shall apply. Where the benefits provided by a 
contract are directly linked to the value of units in an UCITS as defined in Directive 
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principle is placed in what is referred to as the 2nd pillar of the Solvency 
II Directive dealing with Qualitative Restrictions. The 1st pillar deals with 
Quantitative requirements and the 3rd pillar with Disclosure and market 
discipline. According to paragraph 71 in the Preamble the stipulated 
reason is: ‘Insurance and reinsurance undertakings should have assets of sufficient 
quality to cover their overall financial requirements. All investments held by insurance 
and reinsurance undertakings should be managed in accordance with the ‘prudent 
person’ principle.’ 
The reason for including the reference to Solvency II in this paper, 
is the mixed nature of the most of the occupational pension schemes that 
include the saving as well as the insurance part. One part of the 
occupational pension scheme consists of classical saving that is combined 
with the savings of others while the second part is a form of a life 
insurance, yet these are often invested on the capital markets together. 
Therefore, we find both 2003 Directive and Solvency II highly relevant 
for our discourse. Due to the Member States’ diverse reference in their 
respective regulation governing the IORPs, the authors had to analyse the 
prudent person principle implementation through the lens of 2003 
Directive in the UK and the Netherlands and through the lens of Solvency 
II in Denmark. This also allows us to examine the interpretation of this 
principle, given that in theory, the understanding of the prudent person 
principle should be universal across the financial industry. 
Given that the general principle of Article 18 in Directive 2003/41 
for IORP’s and Article 132 of Solvency II have been subject to 
                                                            
85/611/EEC, or to the value of assets contained in an internal fund held by the insurance 
undertakings, usually divided into units, the technical provisions in respect of those 
benefits must be represented as closely as possible by those units or, in the case where 
units are not established, by those assets. 
Where the benefits provided by a contract are directly linked to a share index or some 
other reference value other than those referred to in the second subparagraph, the 
technical provisions in respect of those benefits must be represented as closely as possible 
either by the units deemed to represent the reference value or, in the case where units are 
not established, by assets of appropriate security and marketability which correspond as 
closely as possible with those on which the particular reference value is based. Where the 
benefits referred to in the second and third subparagraphs include a guarantee of 
investment performance or some other guaranteed benefit, the assets held to cover the 
corresponding additional technical provisions shall be subject to paragraph 4. 
4. Without prejudice to paragraph 2, with respect to assets other than those covered by 
paragraph 3, the second to fifth subparagraphs of this paragraph shall apply. The use of 
derivative instruments shall be possible insofar as they contribute to a reduction of risks 
or facilitate efficient portfolio management. Investment and assets which are not 
admitted to trading on a regulated financial market shall be kept to prudent levels. Assets 
shall be properly diversified in such a way as to avoid excessive reliance on any particular 
asset, issuer or group of undertakings, or geographical area and excessive accumulation 
of risk in the portfolio as a whole. Investments in assets issued by the same issuer, or by 
issuers belonging to the same group, shall not expose the insurance undertakings to 
excessive risk concentration. 
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transposition by the Member States, in the following sections we analyse 
the specificities of the application of the prudent person rule in the three 
chosen jurisdictions to assess the character of the rule in practice. 
3.2. PRUDENT PERSON PRINCIPLE IN PRACTICE: WHAT CAN BE TAKEN 
INTO CONSIDERATION? 
First of all, it is necessary to re-emphasise that the prudent person 
rule is a behaviour-oriented principle rather than outcome-focused. Thus, 
the key element of the EU version of the prudent person rule is the 
attention on a trustee’s or fiduciary’s exercise of due diligence. This means 
that pension fund managers will be judged not by a retrospective 
assessment of whether their investment decisions were successful, but by 
whether they followed a reasonable process in reaching their decisions.42 
3.2.1. THE UNITED KINGDOM 
In the United Kingdom, the duties and powers of IORPs derive 
from three sources (1) the trust document and rules of the pension 
scheme; (2) the general law and principles of equity applicable to trustees, 
which is a mixture of legislation, including the Trustees Act of 1925, and 
case law, and (3) the law specific to trustees of occupational pension 
schemes, found predominantly in the Pensions Act 1995 and Pension 
Schemes Act 2015. 
The IORPs in the UK are bound to exercise reasonable care and to 
show the prudence and diligence that an ordinary man of business would 
in the exercise of his or her own affairs. According to the decision dating 
back to the 19th century, the duty is to ‘… take such care as an ordinary 
prudent man would take if he were minded to make an investment for the 
benefit of other people for whom he felt morally bound.’43 Furthermore, 
in the light of the sections 33-36 of the Pension Act 1995, according to 
the investment principles, the trustees of a trust scheme – a pension fund 
– must make sure that there is prepared, maintained and from time to time 
revised a written statement of the principles governing decisions about 
investments for the purposes of the scheme. Subsection 3 of section 35 
                                                            
42 Bevis Longstreth, Modern Investment Management and the Prudent Man Rule (OUP, 1987), 
at 7. (‘Prudence is to be found principally in the process by which investment strategies 
are developed, adopted, implemented, and monitored in light of the purpose for which 
funds are held, invested, and deployed. Prudence is demonstrated by the process through 
which risk is managed, rather than by the definition of specific risks that are imprudent. 
Under a modern paradigm, no investment is imprudent per so. The products and 
techniques of investment are essentially neutral. It is the way in which they are used, and 
how decisions as to their use are made, that should be examined to determine whether 
the prudence standard has been met. Even the most aggressive and unconventional 
investment should meet that standard if arrived at thought a sound process, while the 
most conservative and traditional one may not measure up if a sound process is lacking.’) 
43 Re Whitely (1886) 33 Ch D 347 as cited in Moore, N. Trustees’ Duties in Relation to Money 
Purchase Pension Schemes in Tolley’s Trust Law International vol. 13, no. 1 (1999). 
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stipulates that the investment policy must include (a) the kinds of 
investments to be held, (b) the balance between different kinds of 
investments, (c) risks, (d) the expected return on investments, (e) the 
realisation of investments, and (f) such other matters as may be prescribed. 
Section 36 further provides the rules and factors that should be taken into 
consideration when choosing an investment. The section 36 further 
stipulates that the trustee (IORP) must have regard to (a) the need for 
diversification of investments,  insofar as they are appropriate  for the 
circumstances of the scheme and (b) to the suitability to the scheme of 
investments of the description of investment (investment policy) 
proposed. These broad rules have however been narrowed down in the 
light of the UK case law. 
The case of Cowan vs. Scargill44 has often been cited. At the core of 
the case was the question of whether it was lawful for the trustees to 
restrict funds to investments in the UK and prohibit investments in 
industries competing with the coal industry. Judge Megarry VC reached 
the conclusion that the trustees had breached their duty of loyalty by giving 
preference to the interests of the union in protecting the coal industry at 
the expense of the interests of the pension savers (members of the 
Mineworker’s Pension Scheme). The court case has been cited as laying 
down the rule that the trustees may not take into account interests of other 
groups of stakeholders than the best interest of the beneficiaries, meaning 
the financial interest of the members. 
After Cowan vs. Scargill [1984] a Scottish case was decided in Martin v 
The City of Edinburgh District Council.45 After the Labour Party had won the 
majority in the City of Edinburgh District Council it requested that the 
city disinvested all investments in or related to South Africa due to the 
apartheid regime at that time. Judge Lord Murray held that the council was 
in breach of trust in pursuing a policy of disinvesting in South Africa as it 
had failed to expressly consider whether this cause of action was in the 
best interest of the beneficiaries. 
The interpretation of the above cases is debated especially as to 
whether they exclude any non-financial considerations on behalf of the 
trustees, assuming that ESG is a non-financial consideration which is 
debated too. In 2014, the Law Commission (England and Wales) 
published their report “Fiduciary Duties of Investment Intermediaries” 
and in their summary they state:46 ‘A.18 Trustees may take account of any 
financial factor which is relevant to the performance of an investment. These include 
risks to a company’s long-term sustainability, such as environmental, social or 
governance factors (often referred to as “ESG” factors). A.19 The Law Commission’s 
conclusion is that there is no impediment to trustees taking account of environmental, 
                                                            
44 Cowan v. Scargill [1984] 2 All ER 750. 
45 [1989] Pensions Law Reports 8 (Court of Session). 
46 <https://web.archive.org/web/20140924081849/http://lawcommission.justice.gov 
.uk/docs/lc350_fiduciary_duties_summary.pdf> accessed 16 June 2017. 
IORPS & SUSTAINABILITY 44 
social or governance factors where they are, or may be, financially material.’ The Law 
Commission’s recommendations still await the UK Government’s 
response. However, on the basis of the existing case law and the expressed 
opinion of the Law Commission, the position seems to be that ESG can 
be given weight in decision-making as to investments or divestments but 
only to the extent this is in the best interest of the beneficiaries, meaning 
the financial interest of the beneficiaries. 
3.2.2. DENMARK 
In Denmark the prudent person principle came into profound 
discussion with the implementation of the Solvency II Directive.47 The 
prudent person principle in the Solvency II Directive has been 
implemented by amending the Danish Financial Business Act, Article 158, 
subsection 1.48 The wording of the article is: 
‘(1) In their investment of assets insurance companies shall safeguard the interests 
of policyholders and beneficiaries in the best possible way.’ 
In the preparatory work regarding the previous rule in the Financial 
Business Act art. 15849 on how insurance companies were to invest it was 
– amongst other requirements - required that the board ensured a 
sufficient diversification and aimed towards the largest possible return on 
investment.50 This implied according to the Financial Authority that 
investments could be divided into 4 groups:51 
1) Investments already made, 
2) New investments, where the board in selecting and de-selecting 
investments pursue the highest possible return on investments, 
3) New investments, where the board consciously decides on an 
investment, which does not pursue the highest return on 
investment, 
4) New investments, where the board knows that self-elected costs 
concerning selection and/or post-control – for example 
complying with environment-requirements (at least) equivalent to 
Danish requirements – implies, that the highest possible return on 
investments is not achieved. 
                                                            
47 Directive 2003/41 was implemented by act no. 1561 of December 19, 2007 on 
company pensions, making applicable the rules in Directive 2002/83/EF on life 
insurance to company pensions. 
48 Law no. 308, 28th of March 2015. 
49 Law compilation no. 182 of 18th. of February 2015 with later changes. 
50 The Danish wording was: ’De midler, et forsikringsselskab eller en pensionskasse råder over, skal 
investeres på en hensigtsmæssig og for de forsikrede tjenlig måde, således at der er betryggende sikkerhed 
for, at selskabet til enhver tid kan opfylde sine forpligtelser.’ 
51 Memorandum of the Financial Authority dated October 9, 1997 ’Pensionskassers og 
livsforsikringsselskabernes investeringsstrategi, herunder om etiske investeringer.’ 
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Investments as mentioned in no. 3 and 4 were considered illegal by 
the Financial Authority.52 The Financial Authority did however not state 
that an investment strategy consisting of ”ethical investments” is illegal 
but it has to pursue the highest possible return of investment. 
The question on whether the above mentioned limitations on ethical 
investments should stay in place was debated in the Danish Parliament. 
The minister of economy at the time, Marianne Jelved, argued that the 
ROI-criteria should remain and said (translated): 
‘The requirement of pursuing the highest possible return on investment protects 
the pension-savers from the board of the pension fund to invest the capital in a way 
which is detrimental to the economic interests of the pension-savers.’53 
The Danish position according to the previous rules was thus, 
according to the Danish Financial Authority and the minister of economy, 
that a pension fund was not allowed to give priority to ESG considerations 
in making investment decisions if  the board from the outset knew that 
the investment would result in a smaller return on investment in the long-
run.54  
The question is whether the new formulation in article 158, 
subsection is going to change this position. According to the preparatory 
works to the provision it is anticipated that this will not be the case.55 
3.2.3. THE NETHERLANDS 
The prudent person standard under the Dutch Pension Act 2007 
(Pensioenwet) together with the Obligatory Occupational Pension Schemes 
Act (Wet verplichte beroepspensioenregeling) regulates the Dutch IORPs. 
In addition to these acts, the Foundation of Labour on request from the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment adopted the Guidelines for 
Pension Fund Governance, stipulating among other principles the obligation 
for governing principles of IORPs. 
According to the Dutch Pension Act, the prudent person rule is an 
open standard described in Article 135 in the following way: 
‘1. A pension fund will conduct an investment policy in accordance with the 
prudent person rule, and specifically based on the following premises: 
a. The assets are invested in the interest of entitlement beneficiaries and 
pensionable persons; and 
b. Investments in the contributing company are limited to a maximum of 5% 
of the portfolio as a whole, and if the contributing company belongs to a 
                                                            
52 Memorandum of the Financial Authority dated October 9, 1997 ”Pensionskassers og 
livsforsikringsselskabernes investeringsstrategi, herunder om etiske investeringer.” 
53 Statement by the Minister of Business and Growth in connection with parliament-
decision (beslutningsforslag) no. B 72 of 12th of January 1999 (om demokratiske og 
samfundsmæssigt bæredygtige pensionsinvesteringer.) <http://webarkiv.ft.dk 
/?/samling/19981/beslutningsforslag_oversigtsformat/B72.htm> accessed 1 
September 2017 
54 To the knowledge of the authors, there is no case law that can confirm this position. 
55 Karnov note 2147 to § 158 in act no 174 of 31 January 2017. 
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group, investments in the companies belonging to the same group as the 
contributing company are limited to a maximum of 10% of the portfolio. If 
a group of companies pays premiums to the pension fund, investments in these 
contributing companies will be made prudently, taking into account the need 
for appropriate diversification; 
c. The investments are valued at market price. 
1. Further rules to safeguard prudent investment policy will be set in or pursuant 
to an Order in Council. 
2. The requirements set out in the first paragraph, opening lines and point b, and 
the rules set based on the second paragraph in regard to the diversification of 
assets to not apply to investments in government bonds.’ 
As one can see, the Dutch prudent person rule is a mixture of a 
loyalty principle (1a), followed by quantitative limitations in the 
contributing company (1b). In the Explanatory Memorandum to the bill, 
in relation to the prudent person rule the following is stated: 
‘The prudent-person rule has been chosen as the point of departure for the 
supervision of investments … what is important in this regard is that the investments 
must comply with the principles of security, quality and risk diversification. In doing so, 
an important choice was made at the European level in favour of qualitative supervision 
of investments rather than quantitative restrictions on investments, which have 
characterised the financial supervision of pension funds in many other Member States 
for so many years… The interpretation of the concept of a 'prudent person' does not 
derogate essentially in practice from the interpretation given to the term "soundly" in 
Section 9b of the Pension and Savings Funds Act in past years by the Dutch Central 
Bank. It is expressly not the intention to give a stricter interpretation 
to the concept of "prudent person" than that given to the concept 
of "sound investment". Qualitative rules make it possible to deal better and with 
greater care with individual circumstances (in relation to investments) than is possible 
in the case of fixed quantitative criteria. The interests of members and pensioners are 
served much better by doing so. The other side of the coin is that supervision based on 
qualitative criteria is more difficult than supervision based on fixed quantitative 
criteria....’56 
The Dutch Pension Act itself stipulates that more detailed rules are 
to be laid down by Council, which was carried out in the FTK Decree - 
Decree on the Financial Assessment Framework for Pension Funds 
(Besluit financieel toetsingskader pensioenfondsen). The FTK Decree leaves the 
pension funds’ freedom to invest in markets, asset classes and investment 
instruments intact.57 According to Maatman, any investment restrictions 
                                                            
56 Actuarieel Genootschap, The Prudent-Person Rule in Relation to Investment Policy, 2010), at 
8, emphasis added. 
57 See the Notes to the Decree on the Financial Assessment Framework for Pension 
Funds, Law Gazette 2006, 710, at 16, referred in René H. Maatman, 'The Dutch pension 
system' in Andreas G.F. Hoepner James P. Hawley, Keith L. Johnson, Joakim Sandberg, 
Esward J. Waitzer (ed), Cambridge Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty 
(Cambridge Handbook of Institutional Investment and Fiduciary Duty, Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 80. 
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that result from the FTK Decree have prudential character, they should 
concern the pension fund’s balance sheet ratios and the solvency 
requirements formulated by the Dutch National Bank (DNB).58 
Based on the above, it seems that the prudent person rule provides 
great flexibility to pension funds’ investment policy. However, in addition 
to the FTK Decree, DNB also provided a binding instruction relating to 
the application of the prudent person rule.59 As to the facts of the case, 
referred to as “the gold case”, the pension fund’s assets were allocated as 
follows: 78% government bonds, 13% commodities (gold), 8% cash 
investment and 1% real estate. DNB instructed the pension fund to reduce 
its gold allocation from 13% to 3%. The pension fund appealed DNB’s 
instruction in a court of law.60 Regarding the rationale for DNB’s 
instruction, the first argument of DNB was that as 55% of the 22% of the 
fund’s non-government bond assets  were invested in gold, the pension 
fund was extremely dependent on the gold investment. According to the 
Court, this was a mere quantitative argument that fails to take into account 
the diversification of the assets in the pension fund’s overall portfolio. In 
the eyes of the Court, DNB could not successfully substantiate why a 3% 
gold allocation was more in line with the prudent person rule than a 13%.61 
Secondly, DNB claimed that gold investment was risky and volatile due to 
the fall of gold prices in 1980s and its constant fluctuation. Yet, the Court 
held that this argument, given that the price of gold has been stable for 
the previous ten years, was not convincing.62 Ultimately, DNB emphasised 
that no other pension fund had a similar investment policy as the relevant 
pension fund. This argument was also rejected by the Court, as any 
pension fund should be free to select an asset allocation that accurately 
corresponds to the nature and duration of its liabilities, as long as the 
objective of the prudent person rule is achieved.63 Due to the instruction 
of DNB, the pension fund further claimed that it had lost €9.5m.64 
In the light of this case and the Explanatory Memorandum, the 
prudent person rule is understood in the Netherlands as a flexible principle 
that requires prudent aka sound investments in the name of pensioners. 
Pension funds should not be limited by any quantitative restrictions. 
                                                            
58 Ibid. 
59 DNB Executive Order 6102, <www.zerohedge.com/article/here-comes-executive-
order-6102-qe-generation-dutch-central-bank-orders-pension-fund-sell-it?page=4> 
accessed 5 July 2017. 
60 Leen Preesman, 'Court overturns Dutch regulator's order to slash gold allocation' 
Investment & Pensions Europe, 16 March 2012. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Clifford Chance, 'Prudent pension investments: Court nullifies Dutch Central Bank 
instruction', Clifford Chance Client Briefing, April 2012. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Leen Preesman, 'SPVG continues battle with DNB over gold allocation', Investment 
& Pensions Europe, 11 September 2013. To the knowledge of authors, the court has not 
ruled on the liability issue of the DNB for the financial loss of the pension fund. 
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According to the Court, DNB, as the prudent supervisor, has to always 
provide a well-reasoned tailor-made instruction in the light of the pension 
fund’s asset allocation and the nature and duration of its liabilities.65 In 
other words, as long as the pension funds carry out their investment 
decisions in the light of proper procedures and take into considerations all 
other requirements stipulated by law, led by the financial interest of 
pensioners, the DNB may not intervene. 
3.3. LIABILITY ISSUES UNDER THE PRUDENT PERSON PRINCIPLE  
The analysis of the understanding of the prudent person principle in 
all the three legal systems show that the basic approach has changed from 
the application of quantitative restrictions and the apprehensions that 
certain investments could be imprudent “per se” to a “liberalised” approach 
where the focus is on procedure and where no investment should be 
regarded as per se imprudent as long as it can be documented that the 
procedure surrounding the decision making was prudent.  
As has been shown in section two, various soft law instruments 
encourage the pursuance of ESG goals by pension funds. This raises the 
question how far the board can go in the pursuance of such goals under 
the prudent person rule without incurring liability towards members for 
not having sought the most financially beneficial investments. The 
prudent person principle is a flexible concept leaving room for different 
interpretations in different national legal systems. This also means that 
there are different approaches to the extent to which ESG can be taken 
into account in different legal systems, within the limits of national 
implementation. In English law, such considerations seem to have been 
allowed for as long as the financial interests of the beneficiaries have also 
been taken into account. It is unclear whether under English law, it is only 
possible to give priority to ESG if this at the same time is considered to 
be the most financially beneficial investment to make, and to what extent 
this should be evaluated in the short or in the long term. In Dutch law, 
the focus has been on avoiding quantitative restrictions. The issue of ESG 
friendly investments seems not to have been directly addressed. In Danish 
law, in contrast, it has been quite clear that pension funds prior to the 
implementation of the Solvency II Directive have been required to seek 
the highest possible return for their members. It has only been possible to 
make ESG investments to the extent that such investments were at the 
same time the most financially beneficial investments. This would seem to 
imply that pension fund members could be able to hold board members 
liable for losses suffered by the members for investments that do not give 
the highest possible return, but are - for instance - ESG friendly for purely 
idealistic reasons. As explained, the introduction of the prudent person 
principle in the Solvency II Directive does not seem to change this. 
                                                            
65 Chance, 'Prudent pension investments: Court nullifies Dutch Central Bank instruction', 
Clifford Chance Client Briefing, April 2012. 
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However, in order to succeed with a liability claim several 
requirements must be met. Firstly, the plaintiff must be able to prove that 
he or she has suffered a loss and that the loss has been caused by the 
investment decision. In other words, the member of the pension funds 
must be able to show that the value of his or her pension has decreased 
due to the investment. Obviously, it may be extremely difficult for the 
member of the pension fund to lift the burden of proof in this regard.  
Secondly, the plaintiff must prove that there is a basis of liability for 
the claim. In most legal systems, board members are subject to ordinary 
fault based liability. For board members in financial institutions the duties 
are specified in more detail than for other board members.66 On this basis 
it has been discussed whether board members in the financial sector (in 
banks in particular), are subject to a professional liability standard, 
meaning a stricter liability standard than “the reasonable man” (bonus 
pater) standard. At first sight, the prudent person principle might seem to 
support this view. However, as explained above, the main function of the 
prudent person principle has been to shift the focus from quantitative 
restrictions to procedure. Consequently, it cannot be assumed that the 
introduction of the prudent person principle in itself has introduced a 
stricter liability. In contrast, it could be argued that the turning away from 
quantitative restrictions to a procedural approach implies a much more 
complicated liability assessment as no investments can be regarded 
imprudent per se. Also, the fact that an investment is ESG friendly and 
thus may not in the short run be the most financially beneficial but may 
well be so in the long run, could be argued. Consequently, the task of 
arguing that there is a basis of liability for making an ESG investment 
rather than a more financially beneficial investment may be a demanding 
one for the pension fund member. However, with regard to pension funds 
the liability issue may be complicated further by that fact that members of 
the pension funds to some extent have the right to vote and exercise 
influence on the investment decisions. This raises the question to what 
extent such votes may influence the liability assessment. Under Danish 
law, it is the board that is responsible for making the investment decisions. 
Votes by members may be taken into consideration but the board is not 
obliged to follow such votes.67 Rather, the board is obliged to make 
“prudent” investment decisions. This means that even if a majority of 
members of the pension fund has been in favour of pursuing an ESG-
friendly investment, the board still has the right to pursue non-ESG 
objectives, provided the board – in contrast to the members – believes 
that these investments will give the best return to the pension fund 
members. 
                                                            
66 For Danish law, see FIL §§ 70-71. 
67 See Pensionsmarkedsrådets rapport om etiske investinger, 2007, p. 8 with reference to 
two administrative decisions handed down by the Danish Financial Supervisory body 
(Finanstilsynet).    
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4. THE NEW 2016 DIRECTIVE  
In 2014, the European Commission proposed a revision of Directive 
2003/41/EC in order to improve the governance, risk management, 
transparency and information disclosure of IORPs. This endeavour was 
materialised in December 2016, when the Directive 2016/2341/EU was 
adopted and published in the Official Journal of the European Union.68  
There are several reasons why a new Directive has been adopted. 
First of all, the financial crisis has emphasised the need for sound 
governance of financial institutions. Second, the pensioner-to-employee 
ratio has increased, which calls for more retirement savings and for strong 
and reliable retirement savings. Due to the aging of the EU’s population 
and the increasing investment in these pension institutions across the EU, 
accumulation of capital in these vehicles by private individuals is 
unstoppable.69 Third, pension funds represent a strong player on the 
market, supporting a functioning capital market across the EU and thus 
greater support for cross-border activity has been necessary.70 According 
to the European Council, Directive 2016/2341 improves the soundness 
of the IORPs, information disclosure to the members, enhances the cross-
border investment and portfolio transfers and beneficiaries and also 
encourages responsible investment.71 Member States have until 13 January 
2019 to transpose the new Directive. 
4.1. THE 2016 DIRECTIVE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENTS 
Given the specific focus of this paper, we do not analyse in detail all 
the changes that the new Directive brings. In the following sections we 
focus only on the Directive’s new embracement of responsible investment 
and the possible consequences thereof. 
We have analysed the notion of responsible investment in the light 
of the Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI), adopted in 2006, in 
the section 2.1. The same understanding has been adopted by Directive 
2016/2341 when referring to the UN PRI (Article 58 Preamble). Directive 
                                                            
68 Directive (EU) 2016/2341 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 
December 2016 on the activities and supervision of institutions for occupational 
retirement provision (IORPs) OJ L 354/37. 
69 Currently, there are around four people of working age for every person aged over 65 
years. By 2060, there will be only two people working for every retired one. This means 
an increased pressure on pension systems. On the other hand, presently the IORPs across 
the Europe hold assets worth €2.5 trillion on behalf of around 75 million Europeans, 
which represents 20% of the EU’s working-age population. It is highly presumable that 
this representation will only rise in the future. 
70 European Commission, Memo: Revision of the Occupational Pension Funds Directive 
– frequently asked questions, Brussels, July 1, 2016, at 1 and 
2<https://ec.europa.eu/info/system/files/memo-faq-iorp-directive-revision-
01072016_en.pdf> accessed 1 September 2017. 
71 Ibid at 2 and 3. 
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2003/41 did not mention responsible investment, ESG or CSR. At the 
time of the adoption of the Directive, these topics were far away from 
investment industry. However, the new 2016 Directive has adopted the 
PRI as the standard. 
Article 58 of the Preamble to the 2016/2341 Directive stipulates 
that: 
‘Environmental, social and governance factors, as referred to in the United 
Nations-supported Principles for Responsible Investment, are important for the 
investment policy and risk management systems of IORPs. Member States should 
require IORPs to explicitly disclose where such factors are considered in 
investment decisions and how they form part of their risk 
management system. The relevance and materiality of environmental, social and 
governance factors to a scheme's investments and how such factors are taken into account 
should be part of the information provided by an IORP under this Directive. This does 
not preclude an IORP from satisfying the requirement by stating in such information 
that environmental, social and governance factors are not considered in its 
investment policy or that the costs of a system to monitor the relevance and materiality 
of such factors and how they are taken into account are disproportionate to the size, 
nature, scale and complexity of its activities.’72 
The investment policy represents a decisive aspect for investment 
execution and the IORPs should at least every three years review their 
investment principles, while being available to their members, 
beneficiaries and competent authorities (Paragraph 60 of Preamble). The 
investment policy plays an incremental role for a management of the 
IORP as it serves as a guideline for investments decisions. At the same 
time, the management decides under the prudent person principle that 
remains the key investment rule for IORPs. In comparison to the 2003/41 
Directive, the 2016/2341 Directive, in most parts is identical. Only one 
new provision has been introduced that is directly connected to the PRI 
and ESG. According to Article 19(1)(b) the IORPs, ‘… within the prudent 
person rule, Member States shall allow IORPs to take into account the potential 
long-term impact of investment decisions on environmental, social and governance 
factor;’73 
Thus, reading the Article 19 (1)(b) in the light of the Preamble to 
Directive 2016/2341, from 2019 all IORPs across the EU should be 
allowed to take into consideration the ESG and PRI when making an 
investment. The only obligation is for the pension fund to disclose such 
consideration in its investment principles (Article 30) and towards 
prospective members (Article 41). Yet, the Directive is clear that all 
Member States shall provide for the IORPs to take the ESG into account 
when investing. 
In addition to the clear reference to ESG in the investment policy 
and prospectuses, Directive 2016/2341 introduced an obligation for the 
                                                            
72 Emphasis added. 
73 Emphasis added. 
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IORP’s own governance system. According to Article 21, the IORPs’ 
sound and prudent management, besides including adequate and 
transparent organisational structure, shall include considerations for ESG 
factors related to investment assets in investment decisions, and shall be 
subject to regular internal review. Furthermore, also the risk management, 
both internal and outsourced, take the ESG into review together with an 
assessment of new or emerging risks, including risks related to climate 
change (Article 25(2) and 28(2)). 
Ultimately, Directive 2016/2341 obviously made a step forward in 
considering the ESG and loudly stipulates the pension funds’ right to 
consider the ESG and PRI in their investment policy. It has been stated 
that it is the strongest and clearest requirement on such issues yet seen in 
an EU text.74  
4.2. LIABILITY ISSUES UNDER THE NEW DIRECTIVE 
While the 2016/2341 Directive apparently “nudges” towards ESG 
and PRI, the specific wording of the Member States’ transposition is only 
to be seen. It could be argued that pension funds should be forerunners 
in pursuing ESG goals and it is plausible that some Member States will 
want to go a step further in nudging and will require the IORPs to simply 
take the ESG into account within their investment policy (due to the 
minimum harmonisation directive). However, based on the wording of 
Directive 2016/2341 itself, there is no plausibility for liability in case of 
non-pursuance of ESG in a concrete investment decision. The only 
obligation for the pension funds with regard to ESG is to take ESG factors 
into account in their system of governance, while not being obliged to take 
ESG as a “factor” itself when investing. The natural question to raise is 
what the difference between the two is. What is the difference between 
taking ESG into consideration within a corporate governance of an IORP 
vis-à-vis the investment decision? For the moment, the answer is unclear. 
The ESG represents a set of value standards while the PRI 
represents a procedural tool. The PRI should transpose the ESG into 
every investment decision. The character of the ESG and PRI also lies in 
their unfolding and active character. The first step of a pension fund is to 
define what it understands as specific ESG factors, depending on the 
fund’s own activity and nature of investment. Secondly, once the ESG 
factors are determined, the pension fund has to identify the KPIs together 
with the formula for their measurability, comparability and traceability. In 
practice these are coded as indicators into an investment algorithm in 
                                                            
74 Catherine Howart, ShareAction Chief Executive stated that ‘[t]his is a landmark movement 
for responsible investment in Europe. European policymakers are to be applauded for their bold action 
is not only recognizing the clear financial risks posed by ESG factors, but also for mandating European 
pension funds to act on them.’ <https://shareaction.org/press-release/iorps-ii-ground-
breaking-esg-risk-protection-measures-afforded-to-european-pension-savers-the-uk-
must-afford-savers-the-same-says-shareaction/> accessed 8 July 2017. 
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order to better estimate the investment’s performance. Thus, while the 
pension fund within its prudent management has the obligation to include 
consideration of ESG into its investment performance estimate and to its 
internal review (Article 21), it does not have the obligation to invest 
accordingly, meaning ESG-friendly. From a technical perspective, within 
its investment algorithm, it will consider ESG friendly factors as not 
positive indicators,  thus modelling its investment on ESG non-friendly 
factors, identifying those as more economically beneficial. In other words, 
the pension funds have to do the analysis and adopt the ESG KPIs, yet 
according to Directive 2016/2341 they do not have an obligation to invest 
based on the outcome. It must be presumed that membership votes in 
favour of an ESG-friendly investment policy will not change this. Such a 
vote may be taken as advice but the responsibility to make the prudent 
investments still rests on the board.   
It could be considered whether those pension funds that directly 
stipulate their adherence to ESG-friendly policy in their investment 
statement could have an obligation to live up to this policy, given the 
contractual character of the relationship between the members, 
beneficiaries and the fund. It is a difficult question, open for future 
endeavours, to what extent such policy could be considered to be “self-
binding” on the pension fund’s management so that members and 
beneficiaries would be able to base a liability claim on it. Directive 
2016/2341 does not state the binding character of the investment policy; 
therefore the national law would have to be assessed to reflect on the legal 
character of an investment policy.75  
5. CONCLUSIONS  
Pension schemes all over the world do not only provide a financial 
safe haven for a retired workforce, but also represent substantial investors 
on capital markets. Pension funds’ savings are used to support economic 
growth and to finance the corporate sectors. 
The IORP Directive from 2003 introducing the prudent person 
principle aimed at developing a pan-European pension market, with 
prudential investment supervision across the entire Europe while 
providing the opportunity for cross-border pension activities. The 
Directive was later followed up by the Solvency II Directive building also 
on the prudent person principle. The effect of this principle is a turn away 
from rule-based quantitative restrictions to a risk-based and procedurally 
oriented focus. At the same time numerous soft law instruments 
encourage ESG-friendly regulation. Under the 2003 Directive, the IORPs 
across the EU were obliged to adhere to the prudent person principle, 
while keeping open the substantive factors that should be considered. 
Now, the 2016 Directive suggests also the substantive factors, namely the 
                                                            
75 In the Danish national legal system there is case law to the effect that internal guidelines 
may have an impact when determining liability questions, see U 2009.1835 H.  
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ESG. Yet, keeping the mandatory or non-mandatory nature of the ESG 
values for the Member States to decide. Even though, under the prudent 
person principle the approach towards investments has been liberalised, 
the “best interest” of beneficiaries remains the key principle for all the 
pension funds. Thus ultimately, it is to be seen whether the ESG-friendly 
investments will be over time considered as in the “best interest” of 
beneficiaries”. In other words, whether these will render the highest 
returns. From the liability perspective, the management of IORPs is left 
with a reasonable margin of appreciation. As long as they prudently assess 
the existing information, all that is stipulated as significant in their 
investment policy, they should be considered prudent. It will be difficult 
for fund members and/or beneficiaries to succeed with any liability claims 
as long as the management has acted diligently and procedurally correctly. 
